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Abstract
Various works have demonstrated that small-scale agricultural producers from developing
countries do not generally obtain the potential gains linked to marketing. What can be done to
help them obtain better prices? In this article, we examine two different solutions: increasing
the bargaining power of individual producers and collective marketing through producer
organizations (POs). We use data on 2,487 cocoa transactions undertaken by producers in
Cameroon during the 2005/2006 season (IITA survey 2006). We first of all explore
bargaining theories to identify the determinants of the price received by producers who sell
their produce individually, and the, analyse the effect of collective marketing. We show that
when the bargaining situation is least favourable to the producers (because the prices are non-
negotiable and there is information asymmetry which favours the traders), the traders seize
the entire surplus generated by the trade. In order to improve the prices received by
producers, it should be necessary to manage their access to credit (so that they will not be
bound to any buyer the had obtained credits from, thus ameliorate arbitrate and negotiate the
price), and enable them delay their sale until after the start of the school year (so that traders
could no longer know the producers financial need). We also show that selling produce via
the POs generally results in a price increase of 9% caused by improvement in a reduction in
transaction costs (through economies of scale) and improved bargaining power. The article
also examines whether or not the mere presence of a PO in a specific zone enables all the
producers in this zone (even those who sell individually) to benefit from higher prices.
However, a clear conclusion does not arise in this respect.
Key Words: Reservation price, information, bargaining, collective marketing, price, cocoa
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2I. Introduction
Many empirical studies have been conducted in developing countries to explain the prices
received by agricultural producers. The first analyses (undertaken in the years following
agricultural liberalisation in developing countries) generally concluded that small-scale
producers are unable to take any real gain potentially from selling their product. This was
explained by the high level of transaction costs and the numerous constraints facing the
producers. These constraints include means of transport, a lack of access to credit etc. (De
Janvry et al., 1991; Goetz, 1992). Recent studies also show that producers remain poorly
connected to the market and the traders seize generally the gains from trade (Key et al. 2000;
Gabre-Madhin 2001; Gabre-Madhin 2009). For example, numerous producers are bound to
buyers who lend them money, thereby preventing them from capitalizing on the existing
competition and obliging them to accept lower prices (Gockowski 2008). We therefore
explore the different ways of strengthening the bargaining power of agricultural producers in
view of enabling them obtain better prices for their products.
One solution is to strengthen the bargaining power of individual producers. Theoretically, this
refers to bargaining theory which explains how the surplus generated by trade is divided
between the buyer and the seller (Stahl 1972; Rubinstein 1982; Binmore 1987; Wilson 1995;
Corominas-Bosch 2004). This theory analyses the main determinants of the distribution of
the surplus (such as information available to the different operators and the price-setting
rules). It therefore allows us to identify the variables that can be influenced with in view of
altering the distribution in favour of the producers. This theory has given rise to numerous
tests in experimental economics. It has been sparsely, if not, never used in empirical studies
aimed at explaining agricultural prices in developing countries. This is surprising and
3regrettable as improving or strengthening the bargaining power of small-scale producers is
one of improving farmer’s income and reducing poverty.
Another solution involves promoting collective marketing by producer organisations (POs).
Collecting large volumes (economies of scale) minimize transaction costs at the same time
increasing the bargaining power of the producers. Various works confirm that producers
genuinely obtain a higher price when they sell their produce via a PO (Coulter et al. 1999;
Bernard et al. 2008). Certain POs even claim that their mere presence within a given zone
alters the market structure in favour of producers as a whole (even those who sell their
produce individually). Such an “indirect” effect of POs has not been tested in empirical
studies with regard to agricultural markets in developing countries.
These two solutions (strengthening the bargaining power of individual producers and
strengthening the forms of collective marketing) are not mutually exclusive but
complementary. In the wake of liberalisation, collective marketing by POs gave cause for
great hope (De Janvry et al., 1991; Goetz, 1992). It remains an attractive solution today,
although its limitations have also become clear. POs sometimes have difficulty in merging
and, if they do, it is difficult organising themselves to market their members’ products. POs
sometimes operate very effectively, and obtain relatively high prices though only acquiring a
relatively small share of the quantities produced by their members (Bernard et al. 2008).
The aim of the present article is to examine these two solutions with regard to the cocoa
market in Cameroon. Cocoa plays an important economic and social role in Cameroon: 6% of
exports in 2006; a contributory 115 billion FCFA to the national economy. There are
approximately 260,000 planters and a total surface area covering 400,000 ha is attributed to
cocoa crops. Before liberalisation, the domestic cocoa market was strictly regulated. The state
supplied the inputs, set the price of cocoa, collected the goods from the producers (via the
intermediary of “cooperatives”) and controlled exports. The liberalisation of cocoa marketing
4which occurred in 1995 resulted in an increase in the price received by the producer together
with an increase in the variability of this price (Vrije Universiteit of Amsterdam, 1999).
Furthermore, the quality of Cameroonian cocoa declined. Generally speaking, as a result of
market imperfections, the expected results of the liberalisation policy have never achieved the
desired level (Bernard 2003; Okah-Atenga, 2005). Consequently, producers often find
themselves in a weak bargaining situation vis-à-vis buyers (Gockowski 2008). This is
particularly the case when producers are bound to a buyer or when they sell their goods
outside the main harvesting period (September to December) as the buyers relatively few in
number at that time. The risk of the cocoa becoming damaged if it is not stored in the
appropriate conditions (protection against humidity and insects) is also a major obstacle for
producers (and even for POs).
After liberalisation, producer organisations (POs) began to appear but only in certain regions.
In the “Centre” region, the former state cooperatives disappeared. POs primarily grew up
thanks to the support of development projects such as the Sustainable Tree Crop Program
based at the IITA. According to Folefack and Gockowski (2004), 40% of the cocoa producers
in the “Centre” region are members of a PO. These POs can in part be seen as a response to
the withdrawal of the state insofar as they attempt to replace it in terms of supplying
producers with inputs and marketing operations. In “Southwest” region, the former
cooperatives (such as the Southwest Farmer Cooperative Union based in Kumba) were
placed in the hands of traders (who are also often producers). Although they sometimes
present themselves as POs, these “commercial CIC1s” and “buyer cooperatives”, pre-financed
by approved buyers or exporters, are in fact purchasing bodies acting on behalf of the traders.
In the absence of projects supporting producers’ initiatives, no POs have been able to emerge
in the Southwest region. These different development patterns can also be explained by the
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5structural differences between the two regions (which are the two main cocoa-producing
regions in the country). Due to its agro-climatic characteristics, the Southwest region is more
favourable to cocoa production. Moreover, the farms in this region are larger (on average
three times larger), production is more intensive and output is three times higher (900-1,000
kg / ha compared to 300-450 kg / ha in the central region) (Vrije Universiteit of Amsterdam,
1999). Although the surface area is smaller and there are three times fewer producers in the
region, the Southwest produces more cocoa than the Centre.
This article aims at explain in the differences in the price received by cocoa producers in
Cameroon. It is based on data on 2,487 transactions conducted by 904 producers in the
Centre and Southwest regions. These data are taken from a survey conducted in 2006 by the
IITA. First, in the case of individual sales, we highlight the effect of the bargaining situation
on the price received by the producers. We then estimate the effect of the POs. The fact that
two types of marketing process (individual and collective sales) coexist in the Centre
province allows us to estimate the “direct” effect of the POs, i.e. the price increase resulting
from the act of selling via a PO. The fact that POs exist in one region and not in the other
allows us to analyse the “indirect” effect of the POs, i.e. the effect resulting from the
existence of POs in a specific zone on the price received by producers who choose to sell
individually.  We will present a review of the literature concerning bargaining theories before
formulating and testing hypotheses concerning the determinants of the prices received by
cocoa producers in Cameroon. We will then discuss the implications of these results for
development policies.
II. Theoretical framework: bargaining theories
Bargaining theories attempt to explain price setting. For a transaction to be conducted, the
buyer and seller must both derive a certain level of satisfaction. The price is therefore
6necessarily a compromise between the seller’s reservation price (the price below which there
is no percentage in conducting the transaction) and the buyer’s reservation price (the price
above which there is no percentage in conducting the transaction). The aim of bargaining
theories is precisely to explain where the price will be set within the bargaining range defined
by the two reservation prices. They explain prices based on the characteristics of the
bargaining situation, the reservation prices being considered as exogenous data. In practice,
price differences between producers may result from differences in the bargaining situation or
from differences in the producer’s or buyer’s reservation prices. Any empirical analysis must
therefore incorporate data concerning both the bargaining situation and the reservation prices.
What might be the effect of collective marketing via POs? This phenomenon can alter the
bargaining situation and the reference prices in favour of the producers. It may also (as is the
case of cocoa in Cameroon) result in a change in the scale of the bargaining process (shift
from bilateral negotiations to multilateral negotiations).
We will therefore present bilateral bargaining theories and then explore the role that POs
might play in setting prices.
Bargaining theories have shown that making the first price proposal often plays a crucial role
in the process. To simplify the presentation, we will consider that the buyer always makes the
first proposal (this corresponds to the prevailing situation on the cocoa market in Cameroon).
The difference between the buyer’s reservation price and that of the seller represents the
surplus generated by the trade. It also defines the bargaining range. Three categories of
variable determine where the price will be set within this bargaining range:
• The characteristics of the operators represented, in particular through their level of
risk aversion and their level of impatience. Risk aversion is a psychological element
which determines the influence of risk on the well-being of the operator (and thus on
7his behaviour). The level of impatience reflects the fact that the utility of the
operators falls if the negotiation prolongs. This is due both to the opportunity cost of
the time spent bargaining and to the disutility which might result from having the
money (for the seller) or the product (for the buyer) at a later date.
• The market institutions which determine price-setting measures, in particular the
identity of the party who makes the first price proposal (buyer or seller) and the
possibility of bargaining (“take it or leave it” price versus a negotiable price).
• The distribution of the information between the buyer and the seller. This information
concerns the respective characteristics of each party (reservation price, risk aversion,
rate of impatience, level of information). Four situations are theoretically possible: i)
complete information ii) asymmetric information where only the buyer is informed
iii) asymmetric information where only the seller is informed and iv) asymmetric
information on both sides.
Coupling these different categories of variable leads to numerous bargaining situations being
defined, most of which have been studied in the literature. It is therefore possible to classify
the literature according to the bargaining situations studied. The table below (table1)
summarize this by coupling the price setting rules (take it or leave it price versus a negotiable
price) with the information available to the two operators (cf. table 1). Naturally, in addition
to the situations presented in the table (information and price setting rules), the result of the
bargaining process depends on the characteristics of the operators, in particular risk aversion
and the rate of impatience.
8Table 1: The different bargaining situations and the literature in which they have been studied
Price setting rules
Distribution of information
Take it or leave it Negotiable
Complete information Trivial case Stahl (1972), Rubinstein (1982),
Binmore (1987), Wilson (1987),
Corominas-Bosch (2004)
Asymmetric information (party
informed = the party who
makes the first proposal)
Trivial case Cramton (1984), Fudenberg et al
(1985), Grossman and Perry (1985),
Gul and Sonnenschein (1985),
Wilson (1987), Corominas-Bosch
(2004)
Asymmetric information (party
informed = the party who does
not make the first proposal)
Classic case of decision-making in a
situation of uncertainty:
Coase (1972), Sobel and Takahashi
(1983) ,  Cramton  (1984) ,
Bikhchandami (1985), Fudenberg et
al (1985), Rubinstein (1985), Gul et
al (1986), Wilson (1987),
Corominas-Bosch (2004)
Incomplete information on
both sides
Classic case of decision-making in a
situation of uncertainty:
Cramton (1984), Fudenberg et al.
(1985), Wilson (1987), Dajun and
Katia (1997), Watson (1998),
Corominas-Bosch (2004).
In a situation of complete information, if the price is non-negotiable, the result is trivial: the
price-maker sets the price at the level of the other operator’s reservation price and takes the
entire surplus. When the price is negotiable, the solution is a little more complex. The
operators can “draw out” the negotiations, hence the importance of the rate of impatience of
both the buyer and the seller. Rubinstein (1982) analysed the case where both operators have
the same rate of impatience. In this situation, the utility of an operator i depends on both the
share of the potential surplus that he obtains (x) and the period during which he obtains it (t)
using the formula Ui (x , t) = x _t-1, where _t-1 lies between 0 and 1 and represents the update
coefficient. Rubinstein shows that the operator who makes the first price proposal obtains
δ−1
1  while the other operator obtains 
δ
δ
−1
. If _ = 0, both operators are extremely
impatient: any surplus disappears at the second period. The situation is therefore comparable
9to that of the “take it or leave it” price: any surplus is seized by the operator who makes the
initial price proposal. When _ tends to 1 (operators are infinitely patient), the surplus tends to
be equally distributed. This model (in which the only variable distinguishing between the two
operators is the right to make the first proposal) shows that the market power resulting from
this right is correlated to the common impatience of the operators. Naturally, one operator
may be more patient than the other, thereby giving him an advantage.
In a situation of incomplete information, an operator who is poorly or insufficiently informed
risks taking the wrong decision. The intensity of this risk falls as his level of information
increases. The effect of this risk on the behaviour of the operator depends on his level of risk
aversion. If information is asymmetric, the informed operator enjoys a significant advantage.
If the informed operator also makes the first price proposal, both effects support one another
enabling him to seize the majority of the surplus. Even if the price is negotiable, the operator
who does not make the first price proposal (under our assumption the producer) will find it
difficult to play for time, even if he is patient. The truth is that he does not know the
reservation price or the rate of impatience of the other operator (under our assumption the
buyer). He therefore runs the risk by being too greedy, of causing the negotiations the break
down. He will therefore be encouraged not to bargain too aggressively (especially if he is
risk-averse). The situation in which the informed operator does not make the first price
proposal is more subtle and more complex. In a situation where prices are non-negotiable,
the result primarily depends on the risk aversion of the operator who makes the first price
proposal (under our assumption the buyer): the greater his aversion to risk, the higher the
price he will propose so as to minimise the risk that the negotiations break down. In a
situation where prices are negotiable, a Coasian (1972) result applies. Coase demonstrated
that if the informed operator is patient and the uninformed operator is impatient, the former
can seize the majority of the surplus even if it is the latter who makes the first price proposal.
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In a situation of incomplete information for both parties, both operators are subject to risk. In
a situation where the price is non-negotiable, making the first price proposal remains an
advantage: the price-maker will generally obtain a larger share of the surplus unless he is
hugely risk-averse. In the situation where prices are negotiable, it is generally the most
patient operator who will succeed in obtaining the majority of the surplus, even if the
different levels of risk aversion would suggest otherwise (Cramton 1984; Watson 1998).
The following table attempts to summarise the main results from the literature concerning
each bargaining situation:
Table 2: Summary of the theoretical results concerning the determinants of the allocation of
the surplus in the different bargaining situations.
Price setting rules
Distribution of the information
Take it or leave it Negotiable
Complete information
The price-maker takes the
entire surplus. The price is
equal to the reservation
price of the other operator.
The possibility of “playing for time” enables
the operator who does not make the first price
proposal to obtain a share of the surplus,
especially if both operators are patient
(Rubinstein 1982) and even more so if he is
more patient than the operator who makes the
first price proposal.
Asymmetric information (party
informed = the party who
makes the first proposal)
The price-maker takes the
entire surplus. The price is
equal to the reservation
price of the other operator.
The possibility for the operator who does not
make the first price proposal to obtain a share
of the surplus by playing for time is reduced
due to the fact that he does not know the other
operator’s parameters (reservation price, rate
of impatience), especially if he is risk-averse.
Asymmetric information (party
informed = the party who does
not make the first proposal)
The price-maker  will
generally obtain a larger
share of the surplus. The
allocation depends on the
level of information and
risk aversion of the price-
maker.
The allocation of the surplus primarily
depends on the rate of impatience of the two
operators. If the informed operator is patient
and the uninformed operator is impatient, the
former can obtain the majority of the surplus,
even if it is the latter who makes the first price
proposal (Coase 1972).
Incomplete information on
both sides
The price-maker  will
generally obtain a larger
share of the surplus. The
allocation depends on the
level of information and
risk aversion of the price-
maker.
The most patient operator will generally
succeed in obtaining the majority of the
surplus, even if the difference in risk aversion
would suggest otherwise (Cramton 1984;
Watson 1998).
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What is the effect of collective marketing via POs on the prices received by producers? The
evidence suggests that POs can modify the bargaining situation in favour of the producers
(Bernard et al. 2008). The POs are indeed often better informed, less impatient and perhaps
less risk-averse than the individual producers. A PO can also be in a better position to
negotiate prices than an individual producer. However, the PO may also have an effect on the
reservation prices.  Hence, selling large quantities may increase the buyers’ reservation price,
(Coulter et al. 1999). On the one hand, transaction costs are reduced as fixed costs are shared
(such as the opportunity cost of the time spent negotiating). On the other hand, the probability
of finding an equivalent quantity quickly if negotiations break down is much lower. Recourse
to collective marketing can therefore increase the price received by the producers by two
ways: by modifying the bargaining situation and by modifying the reference prices in favour
of the producers.
Collective marketing may also result in a change the scale of bargaining from bilateral
negotiations when producers sell individually to multilateral negotiations when producers sell
via POs. As we will see later, this is the case for cocoa in Cameroon. Each PO organises
“market days” during which it negotiates simultaneously with several buyers. Asymmetric
multilateral bargaining (for example, a seller negotiating simultaneously with several buyers)
is naturally more advantageous for an operator who can capitalize on the competition
(Serrano 2008).
Finally, we might imagine that the presence of a PO within a zone intensifies competition
between buyers and thus, they adopt higher reservation prices. The presence of POs could
therefore increase the prices received by producers that sell individually. This would provide
a theoretical justification of the “indirect” effect of POs.
The fact remains that the impact of POs on the prices received by the producers is still poorly
documented. These questions therefore seem pertinent. Do POs really enable the producers
12
who sell via these organizations to obtain better prices? Do they have indirect beneficial
effects on the producers in the zones where they are located (even for those who do not sell
their goods via the POs)? What is the extent of these effects (in particular in relation to other
factors which might enable producers to obtain better prices)?
This theoretical explanation of the determinants of the price received by the producer leads us
to formulate a number of hypotheses concerning the cocoa market in Cameroon.
III. Hypotheses concerning the determinants of the prices
received by cocoa producers in Cameroon 
We have seen that the price level depends on the bargaining situation which itself may be
characterised in part by coupling the price setting rules (take it or leave it price versus a
negotiable price) with the information available to the two operators. The first stage therefore
involves characterising, from this point of view, the main bargaining situations in which
Cameroonian cocoa producers find themselves. The structure of the cocoa marketing chain is
relatively simple (cf. figure 1).
Figure 1: Organisation of the cocoa marketing chain in Cameroon
PO
(in the Centre region)
Coxeurs
Approved buyers (also called Licence Business Agency)
Exporters
Producers
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The producers can either sell directly to approved buyers (but this often requires a long
journey as the latter are based in the towns), sell to coxeurs2 (who generally buy the cocoa
from the producers and resell it to approved buyers) or entrust the sale of their cocoa to a PO
which then sells it to the approved buyers. The first marketing channel (selling directly to
approved buyers) is primarily the domain of large-scale producers3. It is not widespread in
the Centre region (it represents only 5% of the number and volume of transactions), but very
widespread in the Southwest (53% of transactions and 59% of the volume traded). The
second channel (selling to coxeurs) represents about half of the trade both in the Centre (51%
of transactions and 47% of the volume traded) and in the Southwest (47% of transactions and
41% of the volume traded). The third channel (selling via a PO) only exists in the Centre
where it accounts for almost half of the trade (44% of transactions and 48% of the volume
traded). As we have already explained, there are no POs in the other production region, i.e.
the Southwest. The approved buyers then resell the cocoa to exporters. This marketing chain
is “funnel-shaped”: with 160,000 producers across the two zones, there are about 1,000
coxeurs who sell the produce to approximately 35 approved buyers. At the end of the chain,
three exporters control almost all the cocoa produced4. The cocoa is moved from the farms to
the villages (where the coxeurs and POs collect the cocoa) before being transported to small
provincial towns (home to the approved buyers) before finally reaching the port of Douala
(where the exporters are based).
Characterizing the bargaining situation facing the producers depends on the marketing
channel concerned.  For producers selling individually (to approved buyers or coxeurs), the
first price proposal is always made by the cocoa buyer. This price can be negotiable as well
                                                 
2 Coxeurs are collectors working for an approved buyer. They are paid on commission.
3 This is convergent with the result obtained by Fafchamps and Vargas (2004) whereby only producers with
large quantities travel to sell their product.
4 These are Cargill, ADM and OLAMCAM
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as non-negotiable. Certain producers are bound to a coxeur or an approved buyer because of
credit that had been extended to the price by the buyer (bound transaction). In this case,
producers cannot capitalize on competition between buyers. Furthermore, they can no longer
negotiate the price with “their” buyer. On the other hand, producers who have not obtained
credit from the cocoa buyers can make counter-proposals (bargaining). In this case, the
negotiations can be protracted. The coxeur may visit the producer in the morning before
paying him during a second visit in the evening (at the end of his round) or even the
following day. The producers are always poorly informed on the situation of the buyers. The
buyers are also in a situation of uncertainty with regard to the producers’ situation
(reservation price and rate of impatience), except at the start of the school year when almost
all cocoa producers need money relatively quickly. Thus, in the case of individual sales, the
bargaining situation can be defined according to two variables: the existence of credit granted
by the buyer to the producer (which indicates whether or not the price is negotiable) and the
selling period (the start of the school year acts as a proxy for asymmetric information
between buyer and producer). This leads us to identify the following bargaining situations for
cocoa producers in Cameroun (cf. table 3):
Table 3: Summary of the different bargaining situations of cocoa producers in Cameroon
(individual sales).
 Price setting rules
Distribution of the information
Take it or leave it Negotiable
Asymmetric information
(informed party = the buyer)
S0. Individual sales with buyer credit
at the start of the school year
S1. Individual sales at the start of
the school year (without buyer
credit)
Incomplete information on
both sides
S2. Individual sales with buyer credit
at times other than the start of the
school year
S3. Individual sales at times other
than the start of the school year
(without buyer credit)
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 According to the different bargaining situations, the price is set at a different level within the
interval between the two reservation prices. In situation S0, the price will theoretically be set
at the level of the producer’s reservation price (the buyer seizes the entire surplus). The share
of surplus obtained by the producer (i.e. the weight of the buyer’s reservation price in the
price-setting process) increases as we shift to towards S1 or S2 and the greatest share is
obtained at situation S3. Hence, if it is not the start of the school year (situations S2 and S3),
the buyer is poorly informed concerning the producer’s reservation price and their rate of
impatience, a situation which may lead the buyer to pay a higher price. This enables us to
formulate the following hypotheses concerning the determinants of the prices received by the
producers:
H1: In situation S0 (producers bound to the buyer by credit and the start of the school year),
only the producer’s reservation price influences the price (the buyer’s reservation price has
no effect on the price).
H2: The price received by the producers is higher in bargaining situations S1 and S2 than in
situation S0. It is even higher in situation S3.
In theory, sales via POs should always be more favourable to producers than individual sales.
In the case of sales via POs, the information is distributed symmetrically and the price is
negotiable (the first price proposal always coming from the buyers). We therefore find
ourselves in a situation which is at least as favourable as the most favourable bargaining
situation in the case of individual sales (S3). Moreover, unlike the case of individual sales,
the POs negotiate with several buyers simultaneously (multilateral bargaining), this enable
them to capitalize on competition. The POs determine a “schedule of market days” which is
communicated to the buyers. On the market days in question, a number of approved buyers
visit the premises of the PO to participate in the negotiations (in generally Pos paying an
entry ticket costing around 10,000 FCFA). The PO’s marketing managers (representing the
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producers selling cocoa) announce the quantity that the PO has to sell and the buyers make
their buying proposals in public. The PO negotiates and generally comes to an agreement
with one of the buyers5. In theory, sales made via a PO should always be more favourable to
the producers than selling individually. This gives rise to the following hypothesis:
H3: Selling via the POs should enable producers to benefit from a higher price (“direct”
effect of the POs).
This hypothesis can only be tested in the Centre region as this is the only region where POs
exist. We might also imagine that the presence of the POs in this region could alter market
operations in favour of the producers (better information, increased competition between
buyers etc.), even if they do not sell their produce via the POs. This leads us to formulate the
following hypothesis:
H4: The presence of POs within a zone enables the producers to obtain a better price, even if
they sell individually (“indirect” effect of the POs). All things being equal, producers who
sell individually in the Centre region – where the POs exist – should therefore benefit from a
higher price than their counterparts in the Southwest – a region where there are no POs.
This analysis should nevertheless be undertaken with caution, as the presence of POs is not
the only difference between the two regions.
As the price received by the producer depends on both the bargaining situation and the
producer’s (PRP) and the buyer’s (BRP) reservation prices, we require information
concerning the reservation prices in order to test our different hypotheses. This is difficult in
empirical studies as the reservation prices involve opportunity costs (and not only the real
                                                 
5 When a purchase is agreed, the buyer pays 20% of the total amount of the purchase. The two parties then
collect and weigh the cocoa and check the quality in the different PO storage points. Once the collection is
complete, the remaining amount is paid to the PO with an upward or downward adjustment according to the
difference between the estimated and real quantities.
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costs to which the operators are subjected). We must therefore examine the reservation prices
by means of different proxies.
The producer’s reservation price (PRP) represents the threshold price below which it is
preferable for the producer not to make the transaction. The PRP therefore depends on a) the
costs paid by the producer (if the price is lower than the average cost, the producer loses
money); b) the price he hopes to obtain with other operators; and c) the consequences with
which he will be confronted if he does not succeed in selling his product quickly to another
operator.
The costs borne by the producers include production costs, transport costs and transaction
costs. Production costs are generally lower in the Southwest than in the Centre (the
Southwest is much more favourable to cocoa from a agro-climatic point of view). The
transport costs of cocoa can be estimated by the distance between the producer’s house and
the point of sale (even if they are also affected by other parameters such as the condition of
the tracks and the means of transport available to the producer). This distance also gives us an
idea of the transaction costs borne by the producers (costs involved in the travel to the point
of sale, including the opportunity cost of time)6. Transaction costs may also include
contributions to the POs (these vary between 10 and 50 FCFA per kilogramme depending on
the PO) and the losses resulting from manipulative tactics employed by the buyers in
evaluating the rate of humidity of the cocoa7. The transaction costs also depend in part on the
quantities sold (economies of scale).
                                                 
6 The point of sale depends to a large extent on the marketing channel adopted: the producer’s house (if selling
to a coxeur), the “cocoa purchasing centres” located in the local administrative capitals (if selling to an approved
buyer) or the PO store.
7 The buyer measures the rate of humidity as this gives an idea of the weight lost by the cocoa during the drying
process. According to official standards, the normal rate of humidity is 8%. For every additional one percent in
the rate of humidity, the buyer deducts one kg of cocoa per 75-kg sack: this is the “deduction”. Only the
approved buyers have hygrometers: the coxeurs estimate the rate of humidity in a more subjective manner by
breaking open the bean.
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The price that the producer hopes to obtain from other operators depends on the information
available to the producer concerning international prices and the extent to which the producer
can capitalize on the competition between buyers. On the cocoa market in Cameroon, the
producers do not all have the same level of information concerning the prices. According to
his possibilities, the producer can obtain information via the Market Information System8
introduced by the ONCC, or National Coffee and Cocoa Board (requiring the availability of a
mobile phone). He can also obtain information from the media (radio, TV and press), from
the POs, his neighbours or even the buyer. The level of competition depends on the binding
practices between the producers and the buyers and on the number of buyers present in the
zone. The producer can be bound to a buyer if the latter grants him credit in the form of cash
or inputs (“bound transactions”). Gockowski’s (2008) study on the impact of credit on cocoa
marketing in Cameroon shows that producers who receive a credit from the buyer obtain
prices which are significantly lower than other producers. If the producer is not bound by
credit, the possibility of capitalizing on competition depends primarily on the number of
buyers in the zone.
The consequences if the producer does not succeed in selling his produce quickly primarily
depend on the producer’s financial needs. These in turn depend on the level and degree of his
income diversification and sometimes also on the occurrence of seasonal expenditure for
agricultural activities or family consumption (such as the start of the school year).
The buyer’s reservation price (BRP) represents the price below which it is preferable for the
producer not to make the transaction. The BRP therefore depends on a) the buyer’s resale
price; b) the transport and transaction costs borne by the buyer; c) the price and quantities that
they hope to obtain with other operators (a price which in turn depends on the seasonality and
                                                 
8 This information system involves sending the SMS “cocoa” using a local mobile phone and receiving the CIF
and FOB prices in effect on that particular day. This price is communicated via an ONCC server. However, this
practice is not well-known among producers.
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number of buyers present in the zone); and d) the potential damage to his reputation if he
does not succeed in satisfying the demand of his customers.
The buyer’s resale price depends on the international price converted into FCFA and the
number of intermediaries separating him from the exporter, as approved buyers are closer
than the coxeurs to the exporters9. The transport costs are linked to the distance between the
place of purchase and the place of delivery of the cocoa (the port of Douala) as well as the
condition of the roads.
The transaction costs borne by the buyers primarily depend on the volumes sold by the
producer or the PO (economies of scale), formal and informal taxes to which they are liable
and the costs of the services acquired in order to keep the producers’ or POs’ supply.
Consequently, in particular in the Centre region, the coxeurs are sometimes the target of
“rackets” by the authorities (in principle, only approved buyers are authorized to buy cocoa).
In the Southwest, the coxeurs sometimes come together as a CIG, and this is liable to formal
taxes. The entrance ticket paid to participate in “market days” organized by certain OPs must
also be taken into account. The cost of credits agreed in order to reserve the supply such as
credits granted to farmers during production, cash advances paid to POs to guarantee the
purchasing contract. That compel the producer to reserve their product is also important. For
the coxeurs, we must also take into account the costs of the different services which they
provide to the producers during or outside the cocoa marketing campaigns. For example, they
act as intermediaries for the purchase of inputs, food products “from town” (rice, soap,
smoked fish etc.) and sometimes building materials.
The price and quantity that a buyer hopes to obtain with other producers primarily depends
on the number of rival buyers present in the zone, the possible presence of POs within the
                                                 
9 The resale price is generally known to the buyers when they negotiate with the producers. The buyers benefit
from weekly, monthly or quarterly forward contracts agreed with their customers.
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zone and the seasonal nature of production (during the main harvest period, the buyers are
willing to pay more as the cocoa is better quality and the competition is intensified by the
presence of numerous buyers).
IV. Data
The data that used to test our hypotheses obtained form a study which we conducted with the
International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) in 2006. This study examined two
provinces (the centre and the South-west) which account for the vast majority (85%) of cocoa
production in Cameroon. The data was collected using a single questionnaire taken from the
baseline survey of the STCP project (Sustainable Tree Crop Programme). The aim of this
survey was to record the sociological, economic and agronomic characteristics of perennial
crop producers. We incorporated a new section in the questionnaire dealing with cocoa
marketing. The surveys were conducted during the period February-April 2006. We
accompanied the teams in the field and supervised the implementation of the surveys directly.
As a census of the cocoa producers was not available, we adopted the following sampling
method. We visited almost all the villages in the 12 Divisions of the Centre (8) and Southwest
(4) provinces. The district chiefs, the local delegates and certain PO directors helped us to
meet the producers by directing us towards inhabitants who were cocoa producers. On some
occasions, we took it upon ourselves to ask the inhabitants to direct us towards the cocoa
producers who would be most willing to answer our questionnaire.
In total, we interviewed 904 cocoa producers and obtained detailed information concerning
2,487 transactions. Of the 904 producers interviewed, most were men (92%). More than 40%
of the producers interviewed were over the age of 50, indicating an ageing of the population
of cocoa producers (a fact which has certain consequences on the level of production and the
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dynamics of the marketing strategies). Furthermore, more than 60% of cocoa producers have
a level of education below secondary school level (cf. table 4).
Table 4: Socio-economic characteristics of the producers interviewed
Sex of the producer Level of education Age
Female 8 % 0- 20 3%
Male 92 % No schooling 7% 21-35 20%
Primary 53% 36-50 33%
Secondary 36% 51-65 30%
Higher 4% >65 14%
Source: IITA survey 2006
The distribution of the 2,487 transactions according to the type of sales (individual versus
collective), the bargaining situation and the province are presented in table 5. As shown on
the table, most transactions in our database concern the Centre region. This distribution
complies with the number of producers and the production areas (which are higher and larger
in the Centre) but not to the volumes (which are larger in the Southwest). Table 5 also
demonstrates that the transactions for individual sales are more than those for collective sales.
Table 5: Distribution of transactions per type, bargaining situation and province
Type of sales Bargaining situation Southwest
province
Centre
province
Total
S0 (individual sales at the start of the
school year with buyer credit)                294                  82 376
S1 (individual sales at the start of the
school year without buyer credit)                  13                191 204
S2 (individual sales at times other
than the start of the school year with
buyer credit)                690                158 848
Individual sales
S3 (individual sales at times other
than the start of the school year
without buyer credit)                  31                395 426
Collective sales (Collective sales via a PO at any
moment of the marketing campaign) 0                633 633
Total
1,028 1,459 2,487
Source: IITA survey 2006
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The main variables collected (or constructed using the data collected) enable us to
characterize the bargaining situation (NEG), the producer’s reservation price (PRP), the
buyer’s reservation price (BRP) and the existence of a possible PO effect. These variables are
summarized in table 6. We also introduced certain control variables. These refer to the age
and level of education of the producers. Gender was not incorporated in the analysis given the
very low percentage of women in the sample. The effect of the level of education is
uncertain. The effect of age is unclear. We might imagine that older, more experienced
producers obtain better prices. However, they also often become more risk averse over time
which can lead to their being less bold in negotiating prices.
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Table 6: Description of the variables used in the model
Variables Description of the variable Unit Category Expected
effect
Pp Price received by the producer (net of the PO
deduction and contributions)
FCFA/kg Dependent
variable
S3 Bargaining situation during periods other than
the start of the school year in which the producer
has not received a supplier credit
Binary NEG +
S2 Bargaining situation during periods other than
the start of the school year in which the producer
has received a supplier credit
Binary NEG +
S1 Bargaining situation at the start of the school
year in which the producer has not received a
supplier credit
Binary NEG +
S0 Bargaining situation at the start of the school
year in which the producer has received a
supplier credit
Binary NEG 0 (reference
situation)
RevProd Total income of the producer 10,000
FCFA/year
PRP +
IndDivers Index of the producer’s income diversification
(the smaller the index, the more the producer is
diversified)
between 0
and 1
PRP +
DistProd Distance from the house to the point of sale km PRP +
NbTransac Number of transactions per producer during the
campaign
PRP +
Refact Deduction to take account of an excessive rate
of cocoa humidity
Converted
into
FCFA/kg
PRP indeterminate
InfoP Information concerning the CIF price
(international market price)
= 1  i f
producer
informed
PRP +
PCaf Delayed CIF price (previous fortnight) FCFA/kg BRP +
DistBuyer Number of km between the point of sale and the
port of Douala
km BRP -
DistBuyer2_ Number of non-tarmac km between the point of
sale and the port of Douala
km BRP -
TypeBuyer Type of buyer: approved buyer or coxeur 1= if app.
buyer
BRP +
QTransac Quantity per transaction kg PRP; BRP +
HarvestSeason Season of abundance 1= if yes PRP; BRP indeterminate
QTot Producer’s production kg PRP; BRP +
NbBuyers Number of approved buyers in the village
(arrondissement)
PRP; BRP +
Zone Production region 1= if
Centre
PO effect +
TypeTransac Type of sales: via a PO versus individual) 1= if PO PO effect +
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V. Test protocol for the hypotheses
Our different hypotheses can be tested by regressing the price received by the producer (Pp)
on the different variables mentioned in table 6.
According to hypothesis H1, for transactions carried out at the start of the school year by a
producer who has received a credit from the buyer, the price should be set at the level of the
producer’s reservation price (the entire surplus generated by the trade being seized by the
buyer). This implies that all variables linked exclusively to the buyer’s reservation price
should have no influence on the price. Inversely, at least some of the variables linked to the
producer’s reservation price should have a significant (positive) effect on the price received
by the producers. In concrete terms, this means taking the sample of the 376 transactions
corresponding to bargaining situation S0 (cf. table 5) and the following regression is
perfomed:
(1) Pp = _0 + _1 RevProd + _2 IndDivers + _3 DistProd + _4 NbTransac + _5 Refact +_6 InfoP
+ _7 PCaf + _8 DistBuyer + _9 DistBuyer2 + _10 TypeBuyer + _11 QTransac + _12
HarvestSeason + _13 QTot + _14 nbBuyers + _15 Zone + _16 Age + _17 Educ + _i
We consider that H1 is confirmed if _7, _8, _9 and _10 are not significantly different from zero
and the coefficients _1, _2, _3. _4, _5 and _6 are all positive or zero, with at least one of them
being strictly positive.
 Hypothesis H2 stipulates that, in the case of individual sales, the price received by the
producers should be higher in bargaining situation S1 or S2 than in situation S0 and that it
should be even higher in situation S3. The theory does not, however, allow a distinction to be
made between situations S1 and S2. We therefore decided to place situations S1 and S2 in a
single category called S12. To test hypothesis H2, we take the sample of transactions
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corresponding to all individual sales for both provinces and the 4 bargaining situations (cf.
table 5) and perform the following regression10:
(2) Pp = _0 + _1 RevProd + _2 IndDivers + _3 DistProd + _4 NbTransac + _5 Refact +_6 InfoP
+ _7 PCaf + _8  DistBuyer + _9 DistBuyer2 + _10 TypeBuyer + _11 QTransac + _12
HarvestSeason + _13 QTot + _14 nbBuyers + _15 Zone + _16 S12 + _17 S3 + _18 Age + _19
Educ + _i
We consider that H2 is confirmed if _17 > _16 > 0.
According to hypothesis H3, selling via a PO should enable producers in the Centre region to
benefit from a higher price (a phenomenon we have called the “direct” PO effect). To
confirm H3, the following regression must be performed on the sample of 1,459 transactions
made in the Centre province:
(3) Pp = _0 + _1 PCaf + _2 DistBuyer + _3 DistBuyer2 + _4 TypeBuyer + _5 HarvestSeason +
_6 nbBuyers + _7 TypeTransac + _i
In this regression we have removed all variables concerning the individual producers as these
variables can have no effect in the case of collective sales. We consider that H3 is confirmed
if _7 > 0. It will also be possible to compare the effect on the PO sale price with that resulting
from other factors.
If H3 is confirmed, a structural test can be performed to obtain a more detailed analysis of the
channels by which the action of selling via a PO enables producers to obtain a better price.
This involves estimating the following equation in which the rX-type variables express the
product of the variable X and the binary variable TypeTransac:
                                                 
10 Variables S1, S2 and S3 are indeed exogenous: the producers are subjected to the bargaining situation rather
than selecting it. By construction, the bargaining situation depends on the action of selling at the start of the
school year and on the fact a credit has been received from the buyer. However, these behaviours are imposed
on the producers.
26
(4) Pp = _0 + _1 PCaf + _2 rPCaf + _3 DistBuyer + _4 rDistBuyer + _5 DistBuyer2 + _6
rDistBuyer2 + _7 TypeBuyer + _8 rTypeBuyer + _9 HarvestSeason + r_10 HarvestSeason +
_11 nbBuyers + _12 rnbBuyers + _i
The coefficients _2, _4, _6. _8, _10 and _12 express the effect of selling via POs on all
independent variables included in the analysis. For example, the effect of the variable
nbBuyers is captured by the coefficient _11 when sales are individual and by the coefficient
_11 + _12 when the producer sells via a PO. _12 expresses how the action of selling via a PO
alters the effect of the number of buyers (nbBuyers) on the price received by the producer
(Pp).
According to hypothesis H4, the mere presence of the POs should alter the way in which the
market operates in favour of the producers: producers who sell individually in the Centre
region should therefore benefit from a higher price than their counterparts in the Southwest
(indirect PO effect). H4 can therefore be tested by taking the same sample and performing the
same regression as for hypothesis H2. We consider that H4 is confirmed if the coefficient _14
in equation (2) is such that _14 > 0.
VI. Results and discussion
The results of the regressions are presented in tables 8, 11, 13 and 14 (in the appendix). Using
the “robust” option of the “Stata” software, the t-Student is corrected for the
heteroskedasticity of the residuals using White’s method. Robustness is tested. The
coefficient R2 is relatively low, which is not surprising given the type of data used (cross
section of primary data).
With regard to the effect of the bargaining situation on the price received by the producers
(hypotheses H1 and H2), the results are as follows.
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Hypothesis H1 is confirmed by the analyses carried out on the 376 transactions corresponding
to situation S0 (transactions undertaken at the start of the school year by a producer who has
received a credit from the buyer). None of the coefficients (_7, _8, _9 and _10) of the four
proxies representing the buyer’s reservation price (PCaf, DistBuyer, DistBuyer2 and
TypeBuyer) has a significant effect on the price (cf. table 8). However, three of the six
proxies for the producer’s reservation price are significantly positive (_3, _4 and _5).
Hypothesis H2 is only partly confirmed by the analysis (cf. table 11). The regression
performed on the 1,854 transactions corresponding to individual sales shows that the most
favourable bargaining situation (S3) has indeed a beneficial effect on the price received by
the producers (_17 is significantly positive). However, the intermediary bargaining situations
(S1 and S2) do not enable the producers to obtain a higher price than the reference situation
S0).
These results confirm the role of the bargaining situation with regard to the price received by
the producers. If the price is non-negotiable and the price-maker (buyer) is well informed
about the producer’s reservation price, the price is set at the level of the producer’s
reservation price (the buyer seizes the entire surplus generated by the trade). This theoretical
result (hypothesis H1) is (unfortunately) confirmed by the empirical analysis. Putting aside
this situation which is unfavourable to the producer (i.e. if the price becomes negotiable or if
the buyer is no longer informed on the producer’s reservation price), the situation does not
really improve. To obtain a significant improvement in the price received by the producer,
the distribution of information must become more equitable and the price must be negotiable.
In practice, and for the case of the cocoa market in Cameroon, this means enabling producers
to a) do without the credit provided by cocoa buyers and b) be able to wait to sell their cocoa
to avoid being obliged to sell at the start of the school year. This requires the development of
a credit scheme that improves accessibility of credit to cocoa producers.
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The effect of POs on the price received by the producers may be direct (hypothesis H3) or
indirect (hypothesis H4). Is this effect confirmed by the analysis?
Hypothesis 3 is confirmed by the analyses carried out on the 1,459 transactions undertaken
by the producers in the Centre region. Selling via a PO has a significant and positive effect on
the price received by the producer (cf. table 13). This effect is relatively large: about 47
FCFA / kg which represents a price increase of about 9%. This result is convergent with that
obtained for cereals in Ethiopia: average price increase of 7% when producers market their
goods via a cooperative (Bernard et al. 2008). Other factors also play an important role in the
Centre region. This is particularly the case of the period of sale: this can result in an
additional 10 FCFA per kg of it is favourable (main harvesting period) or 10 FCFA less of it
is unfavourable (start of school year). This is also the case of distance from the sea port of
Douala where 11 FCFA / kg is loss for every additional 100 km of road.
The structure test that is carried out demonstrates that the PO effect primarily occurs via two
channels (cf. table 14). On the one hand, producers who sell via a PO are not subject to the
losses linked to the start of the school year. First, unlike producers living in the Centre region
who sell their goods individually (they suffer a loss of 15 CFA/kg during this period).
Second, and more surprisingly, transactions carried out via the POs are subject to a 10 times
smaller deduction relating to the distance to the sea port de Douala (only 2 FCFA/kg for 100
km compared to 22 FCFA/kg for individual sales.
Hypothesis 4 is not confirmed. We tested this hypothesis using the regression performed on
the 1,854 transactions corresponding to individual sales (cf. table 11). Although this shows
that the binary variable corresponding to the zone has the expected positive effect (higher
price in the zone where the POs are present), the effect is nevertheless only significant at 10%
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and even then is relatively weak (16 FCFA / kg, i.e. approximately 3% of the average price).
In particular, it would be difficult to ascribe the zone’s effect exclusively to the presence of
POs. The Centre region is not only the region having POs can be observed. It is also a less
isolated though zone though further away from Douala. Furthermore, it is a zone where the
agro-climatic conditions are less favourable to cocoa farming, a fact which could lead to
higher production costs (and ultimately to higher price levels). The existence of an “indirect
effect” of POs is not refuted, nor is it proven.
These results therefore confirm the “direct” effect of the POs: the benefit linked to the action
of selling cocoa via a PO is real and relatively large (increase of about 9%). The results also
demonstrate that the PO effect occurs in part due to a reduction of the transaction costs and in
part through an increase in bargaining power. Hence, the fact that the distance from the port
of Douala results in a far smaller deduction in the case of sales via POs can probably be
explained by cost saving related to the quantities traded (economies of scale). Inversely, the
fact that POs are not subject to a deduction when they sell the goods at the start of the school
year (unlike individual producers) can probably be explained by their bargaining power. The
development and consolidation of POs’ capacities would therefore appear to be another
means of improving the prices received by the producers. The existence of an “indirect” PO
effect was nevertheless not confirmed (or refuted). Today, it is impossible to say if the mere
presence of POs in a zone alters the way in which the market works in favour of producers
who do not sell their produce via the POs. In light of this doubt, it is preferable to promote
both the development of POs and their capacity to obtain their supply from the producers.
VII. Conclusion
We have shown that the bargaining situation exercises a significant effect on the prices
received by cocoa producers in Cameroon. When this situation is at its most unfavourable
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side (because the prices are non-negotiable and there is asymmetric information in favour of
the traders), the traders seize the entire surplus generated by the trade. To improve the price
received by the producers, the price must be made negotiable while at the same time making
information less asymmetric. With regard to the cocoa market in Cameroon, this means
enabling producers to do without the credits granted by cocoa buyers (as they are bound to
the buyer and cannot arbitrate or negotiate the price) and to be able to wait to sell their
produce at times other than the start of the school year. Another option involves promoting
collective marketing by POs. This helps to improve the bargaining situation, since via Pos,
the price is always negotiable and information is distributed symmetrically (sales at the start
of the school year are not subject to a deduction). It also enables transaction costs to be
minimized (through economies of scale) as well as enable negotiations to be carried out
simultaneously with several buyers. Generally speaking, selling via the POs ensures an
average price increase of 9%, which corresponds to the increase observed in other countries
for other products (Bernard et al. 2008). It is also possible that the mere presence of POs in a
zone enables all producers in that zone (even those who sell individually) to benefit from
higher prices, although this indirect PO effect could not be confirmed (or refuted).
The main implications for action are as follows. The first option to improve the prices
received by the producers involves improving their bargaining situation, which requires a
more balanced distribution of information between the producers and the traders combined
with negotiable prices. With regard to the cocoa market in Cameroon, the first point requires
an improvement in the information available to the producers which could be achieved
through the promotion of an efficient market information system. The current system
(managed by the ONCC) only provides information concerning the FOB price and not on the
prices enforce on the domestic market. A reduction in information asymmetry could also be
achieved by the introduction of a producer support policy at the start of the school year (for
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example the distribution of vouchers). This would enable producers to avoid selling during
this period of the year when the traders are aware of their financial needs. With a view to
improve the price setting rules, it would prove beneficial to introduce a credit programme
(possibly via micro-finance institutions) or a complementary health insurance. This would
increase the ability of cocoa producers to manage without credits from the buyers, thereby
giving them the possibility to negotiate the price and capitalize on the competition between
buyers.
Another option involves promoting the development of collective marketing by POs.
Experience has shown that many producers are not members of the POs or only sell a small
percentage of their production via these organisations (De Janvry and Sadoulet 2004; Bernard
et al. 2008; Bernard et al. 2009a).
These two categories of intervention may be complementary. The reason for producers
making limited use of POs to sell their produce (whereas this would enable them to obtain a
better price) could be linked to the question of credit. We can assume that producers with an
urgent need for money cannot sell via a PO because they need access to credit (which is only
available through private buyers) or because they cannot wait until the market day organized
by the PO to sell their cocoa. The development of a system of credit accessible to the
producers (or the implementation of credit systems by the POs) may probably increase the
share of supply obtained by the POs. This hypothesis must nevertheless be confirmed.
More generally speaking, the following research perspectives have been opened by this work.
First, the impact of the POs must be analysed in greater detail. This would require the
heterogeneous nature of the POs to be taken into account. Various works have indeed shown
that the POs are highly diversified and that their commercial performances may vary
considerably (De Janvry and Sadoulet 2004; Bernard et al. 2009b). It would also be necessary
to test whether or not there is an indirect PO effect on the market structure and on the prices
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received by all the producers in the zone in which these organizations are present. The
analysis of this indirect effect is all the more important as the POs only obtain a small
percentage (sometimes very low) of the producers’ supply. The second line of research
concerns the analysis of obstacles to the development of POs. This would involve analysing
the conditions of the emergence of the POs in order to understand why they appear in certain
zones and not in others. It would also be useful to identify the factors which cause producers
to become members of a PO or not (De Janvry and Sadoulet 2004). Finally, it would be
necessary to analyse why producers who are members of a PO choose to sell their produce
via the PO or not. Such studies would help to orient policies aimed at facilitating the
development of POs and at strengthening their impact on the prices received by the
producers.
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Appendix
Table 7: Descriptive statistics for the sample of individual transactions undertaken in
bargaining situation S0 (sample used to test H1)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Price 376 523.078 60.64903 350 700
RevProd 376 69.98774 49.53629 7.5 235
IndDivers 376 0.6476781 0.260799 0 1
DistProd 376 4.879506 17.9356 0 182
Nb Transac 376 4.097552 2.041492 1 12
Refact 376 17.31968 14.5777 0 66.66666
Q Transac 376 711.7292 2212.079 5 34000
NbBuyer 376 2.25 1.556492 1 5
QTot 376 2724.485 7025.356 40 102000
InfoP 376 0.3218085 0.4677925 0 1
DistBuyer 376 262.6596 72.0827 115 378
DistBuyer2 376 79.33245 69.28491 0 223
PCaf 376 807.6572 25.70155 780.386 842.3239
TypeBuyer 376 0.464006 0.4889369 0 1
Age 376 47.53541 14.20437 18 110
Educ 376 0.8989362 0.3018148 0 1
Zone 376 0.2180851 0.4134957 0 1
Table 8: Result of regression (1): test for hypothesis H1
Independent variable Price
RevProd 0.071 (1.04)
IndDivers -4.039 (0.32)
DistProd 0.193 (2.19)**
Nb Transac 5.939 (3.64)***
Refact 0.398 (2.04)**
Q Transac 0.000 (0.04)
NbBuyer 7.401 (3.09)***
QTot 0.000 (0.03)
InfoP 2.592 (0.43)
DistBuyer -0.117 (1.32)
DistBuyer2 -0.164 (1.40)
PCaf -0.182 (1.63)
TypeBuyer -0.550 (0.08)
Age -0.221 (0.99)
Educ 0.597 (0.05)
Zone 12.621 (0.76)
Constant 668.798 (7.13)***
Observations 376
R-squared 0.26
Robust t statistics in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 9: Descriptive statistics for the sample of individual transactions undertaken in the
Centre region
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Price 826 529.6624 59.71741 300 700
S3 826 0.4782082 0.4998275 0 1
S1.2 826 0.4225182 0.4942594 0 1
RevProd 826 47.26667 34.92128 7.5 300
IndDivers 826 0.603096 0.2904312 0 2.078027
DistProd 826 0.355492 2.112453 0 32
Nb Transac 826 2.646403 1.046049 1 6
Refact 826 16.76515 19.46719 0 86.74699
Q Transac 826 229.1191 261.8002 5 2800
NbBuyer 826 3.429782 2.64287 1 10
HarvestSeason 826 0.5726392 0.4949951 0 1
QTot 826 650.1874 803.0162 40 6320
InfoP 826 0.3801453 0.4857164 0 1
DistBuyer 826 342.0266 53.41562 115 450
DistBuyer2 826 21.55448 32.92287 0 90
PCaf 826 805.0628 25.29682 766.0897 950.8137
TypeBuyer 826 0.094431 0.2926046 0 1
Age 826 51.35241 14.67262 19 100
Educ 826 0.933414 0.2494546 0 1
Table 10: Descriptive statistics for the sample of individual transactions undertaken in the
Southwest region
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Price 1028 527.5747 65.13925 350 700
S3 1028 0.0301556 0.1710987 0 1
S1.2 1028 0.6838521 0.4651977 0 1
RevProd 1028 75.12977 50.75766 7.5 235
IndDivers 1028 0.6535128 0.2631244 0 1
DistProd 1028 4.701988 15.20285 0 182
Nb Transac 1028 4.679563 2.168532 1 12
Refact 1028 17.14272 13.70691 0 65.625
Q Transac 1028 675.2192 2601.895 10 68000
NbBuyer 1028 2.114786 1.450399 1 4
HarvestSeason 1028 0.4776265 0.4997423 0 1
QTot 1028 3376.623 7372.158 55 102000
InfoP 1028 0.3317121 0.4710573 0 1
DistBuyer 1028 241.5506 68.64414 144 367
DistBuyer2 1028 95.36965 66.21469 0 223
PCaf 1028 807.9296 32.43611 766.0897 950.8137
TypeBuyer 1028 0.5916399 0.4684961 0 1
Age 1028 46.26057 14.42335 16 110
Educ 1028 0.8891051 0.3141548 0 1
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Table 11: Result of regression (2): test for hypotheses H2 and H4
Independent variable Price
S3 21.270 (4.07)***
S1.2 6.181 (1.60)
RevProd 0.095 (2.93)***
IndDivers 8.149 (1.67)*
DistProd 0.108 (1.65)*
Nb Transac 2.730 (3.56)***
Refact 0.047 (0.58)
Q Transac -0.001 (1.52)
NbBuyer 4.857 (6.22)***
HarvestSeason 5.442 (1.60)
QTot 0.001 (3.13)***
InfoP -4.648 (1.60)
DistBuyer -0.192 (4.11)***
DistBuyer2 -0.125 (2.12)**
PCaf -0.046 (1.02)
TypeBuyer 10.490 (3.01)***
Age -0.395 (3.91)***
Educ 0.152 (0.03)
Zone 15.967 (1.80)*
Constant 589.575 (15.14)***
Observations 1854
R-squared 0.19
Robust t statistics in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 12: Descriptive statistics for the sample of collective transactions undertaken in the
Centre region
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Prix 633 593.2242 61.07331 350 750
rentr_escol 633 0.2985782 0.4579963 0 1
NbBuyer 633 6.723539 3.723561 1 10
HarvestSeason 633 0.5418641 0.4986383 0 1
DistBuyer 633 385.3476 64.7927 161 450
DistBuyer2 633 18.33333 26.91497 0 90
PCaf_1 633 805.1705 24.67323 766.0897 950.8137
Table 13: Result of regression (3): test for hypothesis H3
Independent variable Price
rentr_escol -10.966 (2.77)***
NbBuyer 6.383 (9.08)***
HarvestSeason 9.867 (2.37)**
DistBuyer -0.107 (2.82)***
DistBuyer2 -0.045 (0.73)
PCaf_1 -0.086 (1.45)
typvent_1 46.972 (13.87)***
Constant 612.299 (12.63)***
Observations 1459
R-squared 0.29
Robust t statistics in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 14: Result of regression (4): structure test for more detailed hypothesis H3
Independent variable Price
rentr_escol -15.021 (3.75)***
rrentr_escol 17.458 (2.31)**
NbBuyer 5.879 (8.24)***
rNbBuyer -0.265 (5.00)***
HarvestSeason 8.350 (1.70)*
rHarvestSeason 4.249 (0.71)
DistBuyer -0.216 (5.48)***
rDistBuyer 0.195 (7.79)***
DistBuyer2 0.048 (0.77)
rDistBuyer2 -0.127 (0.94)
PCaf_1 -0.063 (1.07)
rPCaf_1 0.045 (0.38)
Constant 633.478 (12.95)***
Observations 1459
R-squared 0.32
Robust t statistics in brackets  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
